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I.

Introduction

From the Defense of Marriage Act to
individual state bans on homosexual adoptions,
governmental actions are preventing homosexuals
from enjoying the rights of parenthood.2 As of 2007,
over 200,000 children have parents of the same
sex, and many of these children are adopted.3 More
specifically, in Louisiana, more than a quarter of the
state’s 12,000 same-sex couples are raising around
3,000 children.4 Despite the rising presence of samesex parents, various laws and other governmental
efforts hamstring these parents’ efforts at legitimacy.
Some of these actions come at a constitutional cost.
One particular Louisiana couple sought to
legitimize their out-of-state adoption. Oren Adar
and Mickey Ray Smith requested a Louisiana birth
certificate listing both individuals as parents of “Infant
J.”5 Their application was denied.6 Attempting to
assuage the couple’s concerns, the Louisiana Registrar
offered to issue a birth certificate naming only one
partner.7 When the couple turned to the judiciary
to seek help, the federal Fifth Circuit rejected the
parents’ request in Adar v. Smith.8 As a result of this
decision, the parents of Infant J are without a legal
Louisiana birth certificate identifying them as such.
This note will analyze Adar temporally:
addressing its past, present, and future. Part II sets
the stage by laying out the case’s past, comparing
the Fifth and Tenth Circuit’s opinions on Full Faith
and Credit and out-of-state adoptions. This part
also outlines background information: the adoption
process in New York where the couple adopted
Infant J and the history of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause (the “Clause”). Part III then takes on the
case’s present, arguing that the Fifth Circuit creates
a circuit split over Full Faith and Credit and out-

SUMMER 2013

of-state adoptions, despite the court’s claims to the
contrary. Part IV resolves the case’s future, applying
Full Faith and Credit history to the circuit split.
This note urges future courts addressing these issues
to follow the Tenth Circuit’s rationale as it is more
consistent with the Clause’s history and will have
less detrimental effects for parents and children.
Finally, Part V predicts how the errors of the Adar
decision specifically will be detrimental for out-ofstate parents, homosexual parents, and the adopted
children themselves. Unless and until future courts
reject the rationale in Adar, these parties will continue
to be severely disadvantaged—at a Constitutional
cost.
II. The Past: Opinions, Adoptions, and Full
Faith and Credit

A. The Fifth Circuit Denies: Adar v. Smith9
Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith legally
adopted Infant J in a New York family court in
2006.10 Because the California couple could not add
Infant J to their employer’s insurance without proof
of parentage, they requested a birth certificate from
the infant’s state of birth—Louisiana.11 The Registrar,
who directs the issuing of birth certificates, relied on
advice from the state Attorney General and denied the
couple’s request based on the state’s public policy.12
The parents then sued Darlene Smith in
her official capacity as State Registrar and Director
of the State’s Vital Records and Statistics in federal
district court.13 The couple sought both injunctive
and declaratory relief, asking the court to find:
(1) that the Registrar’s denial violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,14
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(2) that the Registrar’s denial violated the Full Faith
and Credit Clause,15 and (3) that the Registrar ought
to issue a new birth certificate listing both parents.16
The district court granted the couple’s motion for
summary judgment.17 On appeal, a three-judge
panel for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.18 However, the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated, reversed, and
remanded this judgment for an entry dismissal of the
couple’s claims.19
1. The Majority’s Rejection
The majority’s opinion largely addressed the
Full Faith and Credit questions, glossing over both the
justiciability and Equal Protection issues.20 The court’s
narrow holding determined that complaints alleging a
breach of Full Faith and Credit are not “redressable in
federal court in a § 1983 action.”21 The court further
stated that the Clause and its accompanying statute22
only relieve litigants of having to retry their case in
every forum—the “res judicata” effect.23 Therefore,
the court stated, the couple only had procedural
rights—not substantive rights—, which are not
protected by § 1983 in federal courts.24 However, the
court did not stop there. The Fifth Circuit went on to
hold that even if the couple’s claims were cognizable
under § 1983, the Registrar did not violate the Full
Faith and Credit Clause when it “determin[ed] how
to apply Louisiana’s laws to maintain its vital statistics
records.”25
The Adar court also discussed the breadth of
the Clause and the state actors to whom it applies,
briefly examining the historical purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause for its finding.26 The Fifth
Circuit noted the Clause’s historically evidentiary
function and found that the Clause imposes a duty
only on sister-state courts to give “the same res judicata
effect which the issuing court would give it.”27 The
court extended this proposition to hold that Full Faith
and Credit, coupled with the res judicata principle of
not having to retry the merits of a case, only imposes
a duty on state courts.28 Thus, in the majority’s view,
the only entities that can violate Full Faith and Credit
are courts; non-judicial state actors are exempt from
the constitutional mandate of the Clause.29 The court
then addressed a practical concern regarding which
state actors are capable of assessing Full Faith and
Credit.30 After all, “a judgment is not entitled to full
faith and credit unless the second court finds that the
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questions at issue in the first case” have been properly
argued and that the original court had proper
jurisdiction.31 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit pointed
out that only courts are able to determine whether
jurisdiction is proper. Because other state actors lack
such judicial acumen, Full Faith and Credit can only
bind state courts.
Next, the court addressed relief under §
1983.32 The Fifth Circuit cited a case involving the
Clause and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
Thompson v. Thompson,33 and adopted the Thompson
court’s rationale for its own holding that Full Faith
and Credit complaints are not redressable under §
1983.34 Moreover, the Adar court held that Full Faith
and Credit claims alone are insufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction35; the couple should have sought
enforcement of the original judgment in Louisiana
state court.36 The Fifth Circuit tied this procedural
requirement back to its reading of Thompson—that
Full Faith and Credit claims were not redressable in
federal courts under § 1983.37 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
ultimately found that federal courts are not the proper
fora for Full Faith and Credit claims.38
Another rationale for the court’s holding
was a potential procedural protection.39 Under usual
procedures, litigants seek enforcement of other
state court judgments in another state’s court.40 If
the second forum denies recognition of the sisterstate’s judgment, claims of a violation of Full Faith
and Credit are reviewable only by the United States
Supreme Court.41 The Fifth Circuit pointed out
that if litigants were able to bring such claims in
federal court under the Clause vis-à-vis § 1983, those
litigants would enjoy the full purview of the federal
appellate system.42 This more immediate review
would be a considerable—indeed, “impermissible”—
advantage over those litigants who are at the hands of
the Supreme Court’s discretion.43
Finally, the court presupposed that even if a
federal court could hear the couple’s claim and Full
Faith and Credit applied to non-judicial state actors,
the Registrar did not violate Full Faith and Credit.44
In reaching this conclusion, the court largely relied
on the Supreme Court’s most recent Full Faith and
Credit decision—Baker v. General Motor Corp.45 In
Baker, the Court differentiated between the level of
recognition afforded to a state’s judgments and to its
statutes.46 The credit owed to judgments is “exacting,”
while a state may make exceptions to another state’s
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laws based on public policy.47 Furthermore, as the
Court outlined in Baker, a state must only recognize
another state’s judgments all the while retaining the
right to enforce those judgments with “practices
regarding the time, manner, and mechanisms” for
enforcement.48 In this subsection of the opinion,
the Fifth Circuit latched onto the “mechanism of
enforcement” aspect of Baker.49 The court held that
the Registrar had not refused to recognize the validity
of the New York judgment when it applied Louisiana’s
enforcement mechanisms to an out-of-state adoption
decree.50 Although the Registrar acknowledged the
couple as legal parents of Infant J, the couple did
not acquire a right to a birth certificate, which is
Louisiana’s mechanism of enforcement.51 Succinctly,
the court stated that “no right created by the New
York adoption order . . . has been frustrated” when
the court denied the couple a birth certificate.52
B. The Tenth Circuit Accepts: Finstuen v.
Crutcher53
The catalyst for the Finstuen case was an
Oklahoma amendment to its adoption code refusing
to recognize the validity of any same-sex adoption
from another state.54 The Finstuen plaintiffs were
three homosexual couples who sought an injunction
of the amendment in federal district court.55 In
the end, the court of appeals found that only one
couple had standing, but it nonetheless struck down
the amendment and ordered the Oklahoma State
Department of Health to issue birth certificates
listing both parents.56
Although the Finstuen court devoted much
of its attention to the issue of standing, the court
discussed Full Faith and Credit issues as well.57
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit cited the same Baker
case as the Fifth Circuit, but for a different holding
concerning Full Faith and Credit.58 In doing so, the
court rejected the State’s argument that requiring
it to issue a birth certificate would be “tantamount
to giving the sister state control over the effect of
its judgment in Oklahoma.”59 Rather, the court
stated that the argument “conflates Oklahoma’s
obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister
state’s judgment with its authority to apply its own
state laws in deciding what state-specific rights and
responsibilities flow from that judgment.”60 In this
way, the Tenth Circuit tied the Clause’s historically
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evidentiary purpose to Oklahoma’s role as a sisterstate recognizing another state’s judgment.61 The
court explained that if Oklahoma had no existing
“mechanism” dealing with re-issuing birth certificates,
then the couple’s claims would fail.62 However, since
the state already had statutes instructing families on
how to obtain a birth certificate, the State must apply
the mechanisms to all people in the same situation.63
Thus, the amendment violated Full Faith and Credit
by singling out homosexual couples and out-of-state
adoptions.64
Next, the court focused on arguments as to
how the Oklahoma amendment violated Full Faith
and Credit.65 The court noted that many state courts
acknowledge the validity of out-of-state adoption
decrees and afford them Full Faith and Credit.66 The
Tenth Circuit then cited a Supreme Court decision,
which held that Full Faith and Credit is honored
so long as the second forum “does not deny the
effective operation of the [out-of-state adoption]
proceedings.”67 Thus the Tenth Circuit held that
to deny the effective operation of an out-of-state
judgment is to deny Full Faith and Credit.68
Addressing similar facts five years earlier, the
Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. The
Finstuen couple brought their Full Faith and Credit
claim under § 1983 and the court did not dismiss the
case.69 Instead, the court held that adoption decrees
are entitled to recognition under Full Faith and
Credit.70 Additionally, the Finstuen court directed a
non-judicial state actor to comply with Full Faith and
Credit and issue a birth certificate for the couple.71
This holding diametrically opposes the Fifth Circuit’s
holding. The Tenth and Fifth Circuits appear to
treat adoption decrees differently, but both courts
nevertheless discuss the level of “faith and credit” due
to adoption decrees. The following section outlines
adoption proceedings to better understand these
adoption cases.
C. Becoming a Parent
The adoption process transforms people into
legal parents and severs former parents’ relationships
with the adoptee.72 In this way, adoption orders
are judgments because they are “a court’s final
determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties in the case . . . .”73 This section emphasizes
the thoroughness and finality of adoption decrees

61

and, because of these qualities, shows that they are
entitled to the highest level of Full Faith and Credit
as judgments.74
New York statutorily authorizes those who
may adopt and what effect that adoption decree has.75
Furthermore, the New York legislature has given
its adoption decrees the same force as judgments
from any other state court.76 To effect the parental
transformation, the judges “make an order approving
the adoption and directing that the adoptive child
shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all
respects as the child of the adoptive parents or
parent” so long as the best interests of the child are
being served.77 Although there are slight differences
between perfecting a private adoption and agency
adoption, most steps are largely the same.78 For
example, both private and agency adoptions require
a personal showing for examination of character, the
filing of a formal petition, and completing numerous
affidavits.79 Thus, in either scenario, adoptive parents
are determined and pronounced the parents of the
child—a transformation entitled to the highest level
of Full Faith and Credit.80
In addition to the adoption procedures, New
York explicitly states the effects of an adoption.81
Upon the issuance of a New York adoption order, the
biological parents lose all rights and responsibilities
when the adoptive parents gain them.82 Furthermore,
another effect of a valid adoption is that the vital
statistics statutes provide for the issuing of a new
birth certificate after the adoption.83 Most notably,
the language of the section allows for no discretion for
issuing the new birth certificate. Rather, the section
states that a:
new certificate of birth shall be made
whenever . . . notification is received
by . . . the commissioner from . . .
a judgment, order or decree relating to the adoption of such person.
Such judgment, order or decree shall
also be sufficient authority to make
a new birth certificate with conforming change in the name of such
person on the birth certificate of any
of such person’s children.84
New York’s laws are comparable to those of
most other states, which similarly do not allow for
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discretion in issuing a new birth certificate upon a
valid adoption decree.85
The importance of this statutory background
and comparison is that adoptions transform former
non-parents into full-fledged parents. Additionally, it
also shows that many states treat the issuance of birth
certificates as part-and-parcel of a valid adoption
decree and an incidental effect of perfecting a valid
adoption.86 In this way, receiving the new birth
certificate is the final step towards parenthood. Even
if the statutes do not tether adoptions and birth
certificates, they certainly show that states have their
own ways of issuing birth certificates. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause obligates states to apply these
statutes even-handedly, and the following section on
the Clause’s history and jurisprudence helps illustrate
this inter-state obligation.
D. States Interact: Full Faith and Credit
James Madison described the predecessor
to the current Full Faith and Credit Clause as “of
little importance under any interpretation which it
will bear.”87 This description referred to an almost
identical provision in the Articles of Confederation,
which drew inspiration from former practices and
principles of English courts.88 Although the Clause’s
history and jurisprudence do not decisively resolve the
current circuit split, an overview aids the discussion
of how to ultimately resolve it.
1. From England to America
Many Full Faith and Credit scholars have
discussed the evidentiary purposes of the Clause.89
Their research reveals that English courts used the
terms “faith” and “credit” when discussing which
documents may properly be submitted to the English
courts.90 From the court’s perspective, enforcing
a judgment from a foreign court may allow the
infiltration of an “inferior” system of justice.91 Thus,
English courts of record distinguished documents
allowed into evidence based on the origin of the
judgment.92 Because the drafters of the Articles of
Confederation were familiar with English law and
legal terminology, they likely used the phrase “full
faith and credit” with this evidentiary meaning in
mind.93
Nevertheless, as Madison’s quote indicates,
early jurisprudence from various state courts reveals
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how differently the Clause was interpreted.94
Representative of the nation’s relative disunity under
the Articles, some states enacted their own legislation
regarding what faith, credit, and effect were given to
sister-state judgments.95 This legal uncertainty about
the meaning of the Articles of Confederation Clause
prompted Madison to describe it as “extremely
indeterminate.”96
The Constitutional Convention delegates
did not spend much time debating the Clause when
they drafted the federal Constitution.97 When the
Clause was first brought up for discussion on August
29, 1787, the drafters sought to clarify the meaning
of the article.98 The issue was then delegated to a subcommittee for clarification, and on September 3,
the Convention voted in the current constitutional
Article.99 Notably, Congress could now discretionarily
declare the inter-state effects of a sister-state’s
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings.100
James Wilson remarked that without this “Effects
Clause,” the constitutional Article would “amount
to nothing more than what now takes place among
all Independent Nations,”101 indicating that the
Framers envisioned a more unified country than that
under the Articles of Confederation. Many scholars
further argue that the addition of this discretionary
power means that the first part of the Clause is a
self-executing replica of the former Clause.102 That
is, despite trying to unify the country by replacing
the Articles of Confederation, some contend that
the framers used the terms “faith” and “credit” for
evidentiary purposes only.103 The first time Congress
acted on its Full Faith and Credit power was in 1790,
passing an act with the same language of the Clause
itself.104 This act restated Congress’s power to declare
effects of one state’s judgments, all while passing on
the opportunity to do so.105 Indeed, the Effects Clause
is “relatively neglected in legal literature”106 and
has proven “little use for” the legal community.”107
However, this is not to say that Congress has never
acted on its discretionary power.
As one scholar points out, Congress’s
discretionary power has not historically commanded
much legal attention.108 The Effects Clause—
perhaps the entire Full Faith and Credit clause—has
generated little attention until recent decades.109 The
recent attention may be due to the increased mobility
of citizens and how the Clause operates in a modern
federalist society. A particular source of interest is the
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advent of homosexual marriage and how the Clause
obligates states to acknowledge those marriages.110
Indeed, Congress has only exercised its discretionary
power in family law, enacting statutes concerning
child custody and support.111 The increasing attention
culminated in 1996 with the passage of the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA).112
The Clause’s history does not decisively
determine its scope, much less how it resolves the
Adar/Finstuen split. What this history does show is
that the framers likely had the evidentiary function
in mind when drafting the Clause. Furthermore,
in an effort to unify the country from independent
sovereignties and to resolve the confusion of the
Articles of Confederation, the framers also gave
Congress a new discretionary power to determine
nationwide effects. Unfortunately for the issue of
deciding the Adar/Finstuen split, Congress has not
legislated specifically on the nationwide effects of
adoption decrees. Nevertheless, the historical purpose
of the Clause will indicate that the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in Finstuen is most consistent with this
purpose because it prevents states from denying other
states’ citizens the full rights granted by those other
states. Examining the Clause’s jurisprudence will
bolster this argument as well.
2. The Courts Tackle the Clause
As early as 1794, judges asserted that
Congress had already declared the substantive effects
of a sister-state’s judgments.113 Not all circuit judges,
however, agreed with this point of view.114 The issue
finally reached the United States Supreme Court in
1813 in a case concerning what plea was available to a
New York debtor in a Washington, D.C. court.115 The
Court held that “Congress have therefore declared the
effect of the record” in the Act of 1790.116 Some argue
that this Court’s decision on Congress’s power was a
“revolution.”117 However, this decision concerning
the substantive effects of sister-state’s judgment was
not definitive; if it were, no discussion would remain
today as to what effects are given to a sister-state’s
judgment. For years to come, courts would continue
to struggle with the issue of effects of sister-state
judgments.118
Two centuries later, the Court would again
address the Full Faith and Credit conundrum in
Baker.119 There the Court held that the Clause did
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not prevent a witness from giving testimony in the
second forum’s courts despite the first forum’s issuance
of an injunction against the testimony.120 The Court
cited broadly-worded precedent that envisioned
an expansive scope for Full Faith and Credit.121
Nevertheless, the Baker Court differentiated between
the “credit owed to laws (legislative measures and
common law) and to judgments.”122 However, states
were still left to determine for themselves the “time,
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments
. . . subject to the even-handed control of forum
law.”123 In the end, the second forum applied its own
mechanism to admit evidence into trial.124
The Clause’s jurisprudence throughout the
years has been inconsistent. Early cases conflicted over
whether Congress had acted on its power to determine
substantive effects of sister-states’ judgments.125
The most recent decision tempers broadly-worded
precedent and the unifying force of Full Faith and
Credit by carving out exceptions for time, manner,
and mechanisms for enforcement, as well as creating
a tiered system of credit owed to acts, judgments, and
records.126 Although inconsistent, the jurisprudence
and Clause history will become a platform for this
note’s urging that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale is the
most consistent with the purpose of the Clause.
III. The Present: Circuit Split
Supreme Court Rule 10 speaks to the Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction for writs of certiorari.127 The
Rule states that a factor influencing the Court’s
discretion is when a United States court of appeals
has entered a decision in conflict with the decision
of another United States court of appeals on the
same “important matter.”128 No matter the minor
factual differences, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits are
split on three important matters: (1) what claims
are actionable under § 1983, (2) how to treat birth
certificates with adoption orders, and (3) which state
actors are obligated under Full Faith and Credit.
Because the Supreme Court passed on resolving
the issue,129 future courts should recognize the split
and consider competing arguments as to why one
rationale is preferable over another.130
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A. Bad Facts Make Bad Law
A court may distinguish its holding from
another court’s decision based on factual and legal
distinctions, although these distinctions may not be
the “important matters” of the cases.131 If this occurs,
then the second court mistakenly creates a circuitsplit based on unimportant factual differences. A
more noticeable split is created if the second court
cites factual differences, which, in the end, are not
differences at all. The Fifth Circuit has done just
that.132
Most noticeably, the legal impediment facing
the Adar couple was different from the one facing the
Finstuen couple.133 That is to say, the Tenth Circuit
found a statutory amendment unconstitutional,
whereas the Fifth Circuit affirmed an administrative
decision of a state actor. Not only was the Oklahoma
amendment a more formal legislative act, it was more
broadly worded than the administrative decision of
the Louisiana Registrar. According to the amended
Oklahoma statute, the state would “not recognize an
adoption by more than one individual of the same sex
from any other state . . . .”134 The Adar court, in contrast,
insisted that the Registrar did recognize the validity
of the out-of-state decree but merely determined its
effects in accordance with Louisiana law.135 In fact, the
Registrar offered to issue a Louisiana birth certificate
listing one of the plaintiffs as a parent.136 Because
the Clause commands states to recognize out-of-state
judgments, Oklahoma’s broad non-recognition of all
out-of-state decrees was so patently in violation of the
Clause that it necessitated invalidation. The Tenth
Circuit’s holding is thus inevitable, whereas the Fifth
Circuit’s decision is merely explainable because the
Louisiana Registrar’s actions were not so patently in
violation of Full Faith and Credit. Nevertheless, this
note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a birth
certificate amounted to the same non-recognition of
the adoption decree.137
Another factual distinction is the types
of adoption in each case. The Adar couple jointly
adopted Infant J as an unmarried couple.138 When
they sought recognition and enforcement of that
adoption, the Registrar and Fifth Circuit denied their
request.139 On the other hand, the Finstuen couple
sought recognition and enforcement of a stepparent
adoption.140 California recognizes stepparent
adoptions and gives them the effect of any other
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adoption decreed in the state.141 Therefore, in terms of
rights and responsibilities granted to adopted parents,
the New York and California adoption orders carried
the same weight for the respective parents.
Factually, these cases are not too different—
both couples sought the same legal recognition and
enforcement of substantively similar adoptions. The
Adar court attempted to distinguish these similar
cases when it could have and should have adopted the
Tenth Circuit’s rationale, which is more consistent
with the Constitution and less detrimental to adoptive
families. In contrast to the factual “distinctions,” the
two circuits’ legal holdings are wholly opposite. This
note urges that the legal differences are, in fact, the
“important matters” which ultimately create a circuit
split.
B. The Important Matters
The Fifth Circuit’s narrow holding was that
a violation of Full Faith and Credit is not actionable
under § 1983, but the court expanded the holding
in dicta.142 In Adar and Finstuen, the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits reach different holdings on three
vital issues: (1) federal jurisdiction under § 1983,
(2) birth certificates vis-à-vis adoption orders, and
(3) obligations of state actors under Full Faith and
Credit. Thus, the courts created a split on these three
important matters.
While the Fifth Circuit attempts to
distinguish Finstuen on the jurisdictional issue, the
court was misguided. The Fifth Circuit’s dismissal
of subject matter jurisdiction creates a split with the
Tenth Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically,
the Tenth Circuit has allowed recovery for Full Faith
and Credit violations under § 1983, whereas the Fifth
Circuit has foreclosed on exercising such jurisdiction.
Because the Finstuen court allowed recovery, the court
clearly found the jurisdiction upon which to decide
the case and grant relief.143 Although the majority of
the Tenth Circuit opinion is devoted to justiciability,
the absence of any discussion concerning subject
matter jurisdiction does not mean the court lacked
the jurisdiction.144 Thus, the varying treatments of
Full Faith and Credit violations with § 1983 remedys
constitute a split concerning an important legal
issue—subject matter jurisdiction.
The circuits further differ on how each treats
birth certificates vis-à-vis adoption decrees. The
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Oklahoma adoption statutes still afforded adoptive
parents the ability to receive “a supplementary birth
certificate . . . with the names of the adoptive parents
listed as the parents.”145 For the Tenth Circuit, this
practice of singling out some out-of-state adoption
decrees as unrecognizable rendered the amendment
unconstitutional, so the Doel couple was entitled to
a birth certificate because of their adoption order.146
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit singled out
the birth certificate as merely a mechanism of
enforcement.147 The Adar court cited a Revised Statute
and Children’s Code articles for its proposition that
the couple does not have a right to a supplemental
birth certificate.148 However, similar to Oklahoma,
Louisiana has a statute granting adoptive parents
the right to “a new certificate of live birth of the
person adopted.”149 Louisiana also provides for the
recognition of “foreign adoptions” which instructs
the Registrar to make a “new record in its archives
showing . . . the names of the adoptive parents . . . that
[are] available and adds to the completeness of the
certificate of the adopted child.”150 However, despite
this directive to the state registrar, the Fifth Circuit
singles out the birth certificate and places it “in the
heartland of enforcement, and therefore outside the
full faith and credit obligation of recognition.”151
Thus, the Fifth Circuit does not see birth certificates
as part-and-parcel of valid adoptions despite the plain
language of Louisiana’s laws. This conclusion stands
in stark contrast with the Tenth Circuit.
Finally, the circuits differ on which state
actors are obligated by Full Faith and Credit. Again,
the Tenth Circuit’s decision on this matter was not
as detailed as the Fifth Circuit’s. Nevertheless, the
Finstuen court directed the Oklahoma Commissioner
of Health to issue a new birth certificate to the Doel
couple in compliance with Full Faith and Credit.152
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit granted the Louisiana
Registrar immunity from Full Faith and Credit, even
though the respective state officers have substantially
similar duties for keeping records of vital statistics.153
One may attempt to distinguish the two cases because
the focus of the Tenth Circuit was an amendment and
not the state actor’s decision. However, this distinction
is irrelevant because the Finstuen court nevertheless
directed the commissioner to comply with Full
Faith and Credit and issue the birth certificate. The
distinction is further without merit because, in both
cases, the couples initially sought out the respective
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state actors for the reissued birth certificates. Thus, in
both cases, the state actor denied the request, yet only
one circuit held the non-judicial state actor to the Full
Faith and Credit obligation.
Although the Adar majority denied creating
a circuit split by distinguishing Finstuen, the dissent
rightfully pointed out that the majority did, in fact,
create a split.154 This split ultimately highlights the
difference in the respective courts’ treatments of the
issues and demonstrates the superiority of the Tenth
Circuit’s rationale concerning out-of-state adoptions.
Future courts, then, will need guidance as to decide
cases in line with either the Fifth or Tenth Circuit.
IV. The Future: Settling the Split
Applying the historical analysis of Full Faith
and Credit to the split reveals that the Tenth Circuit’s
rationale is the most consistent with the Clause. The
effects of a sister-state’s judgment ought to be applied
in the second-forum evenhandedly. Furthermore,
the evidentiary nature of the Clause caused the Fifth
Circuit to hold mistakenly that the Clause only binds
state courts. Additionally, the broad principles of §
1983 compel an interpretation giving plaintiffs a
wide avenue into federal courts to seek redress for any
rights—substantive or procedural. The Fifth Circuit
narrowed rather than opened future litigants’ access
to federal courts under § 1983.
A. Full Faith and Credit to the Rescue
Without clear indication from either the
Clause’s history or case law, this article posits three
alternative possibilities for resolving the existing
circuit split.155 Combining history and jurisprudence,
the split should be resolved consistent with the Tenth
Circuit for three reasons: (1) the Framers sought a
more unified country; (2) case law consistently
states that judgments are the most protected class of
documents; and (3) no exceptions ought to be made
for the recognition of adoption decrees.
First, one may take an a fortiori approach
to the Constitutional Clause.156 That is to say, if the
Framers sought to create a less fragmented Union,
then it follows that they sought a change from
both the English court system and the Articles of
Confederation. This is exemplified in the nationwide
power Congress has to declare inter-state effects.157
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Congressional determination of effects of judgments
unified the states with each other and marked a
change from the English system and the Articles of
Confederation. On the other hand, the Framers were
either lawyers or familiar with English terminology
used in the Articles of Confederation and thus
understood the evidentiary meaning of “full faith
and credit.”158 However, contextual quotes from
James Madison and James Wilson indicate a different
approach. No longer was the article supposed to
be “indeterminate . . . and of little importance.”159
Rather, the new article was to amalgamate the states
into a new union so that each state could not ignore its
federalist obligations. Under this analysis, the Clause
imposes a much more stringent duty on states with
respect to judgments, including adoption agreements.
This is the Tenth Circuit’s view of not undermining
the judgment of a sister-state whatsoever.
Secondly, early cases might have held that
the first forum determines the effects of judgments,
like adoption decrees.160 Although the Baker Court
distinguished tiers of recognition for different classes
of documents, the Court has never lessened the
recognition due to judgments.161 This exception-free
treatment of judgments is consistent with early quotes
indicating that the Clause was meant to unite the
separate states. Thus, under the Court’s assessment
of judgments, adoption decrees are consistently given
the highest level of faith and credit. States cannot
make exceptions or temper a sister-state’s judgments.
The Tenth Circuit decided Finstuen without
making exceptions for a sister-state’s adoptions, thus
conforming its decision to the Clause’s jurisprudence
and history.
As for the scope of Full Faith and Credit,
the Clause’s history perhaps excuses, but does not
necessitate, the Fifth Circuit’s holding that Full
Faith and Credit binds only courts. Because of the
evidentiary force of the Clause’s first sentence, one
might think that only courts should be concerned
with Full Faith and Credit.162 However, the plain
language of the Clause speaks to states as a whole.163
Furthermore, the classes of protected documents
extend to every branch of government: legislative
(“public acts”), executive (“records”), and judicial
(“judgments”). These two elements of the Clause
indicate that Full Faith and Credit obligates state
actors across the board, not just the judiciary.
Although Congress’s 1790 Act speaks to “courts”
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specifically as under the command of full faith and
credit, early legislators were likely concerned only
with the evidentiary role of the Clause rather than
interstate effects of judgments.164 The fact that the
rest of the statute addresses how courts authenticate
documents for evidence bolsters this argument.165 The
early Congress balked on the issue of declaring the
effects of judgments, meaning it only addressed the
Clause’s evidentiary aspect. Therefore, the 1790 Act
only addresses evidence and necessarily only speaks to
courts.166 This notion does not, and cannot, derogate
from the Constitutional command, which speaks to
states as a whole. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit was
misguided when it applied the inter-state command
to courts alone. The Tenth Circuit’s implicit holding
that non-judicial state actors are obligated is more in
line with the historic analysis of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
Finally, more specific to the cases at hand,
recent jurisprudence and state adoption statutes read
together indicate that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale is
more fitting. New York’s adoption procedures, despite
the lack of some adversarial setting, are certainly
“judgments” because they determine the best interest
of the child and pronounce the legal transformation of
the biological and adoptive parents’ relationship to the
child.167 Because Full Faith and Credit is “exacting” for
judgments, courts have almost no leeway in denying
recognition of judgments like adoption decrees.168
The denial of a birth certificate puts an onerous
burden on an adoptive parent attempting to prove
legal parenthood, which may amount to effective
non-recognition of the adoption decree. 169 Because
the jurisprudence and adoption statutes indicate that
judgments are to be given the highest level of faith
and credit, any practice that even subtly undermines
the inter-state recognition of adoption decrees ought
to be greatly scrutinized. The Fifth Circuit imposed
such a burden on adoptive parents, whereas the Tenth
Circuit did not. The remaining resolution, then, is
the federal redressability of § 1983 for Full Faith and
Credit claims.
B. Petitioners at the Doorway: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 broadly states the
rights it protects: any “rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws.”170 So long as
the rights created by some law are “enforceable,” the
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section provides protection for violations of those
rights and an avenue into federal court.171 The Court
has articulated three purposes for the statute: (1) to
“override certain kinds of state laws”; (2) to “provide
a remedy where state law was inadequate”; and (3) “to
provide for a federal remedy where the state remedy .
. . was not available in practice.”172
This expansive avenue into federal court,
however, is not without limitations. For example,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits unsuccessful
state court173 plaintiffs from reasserting their claim
in federal court under § 1983.174 Furthermore, the
section does not create an independent right; rather,
it only protects existing rights.175 Nevertheless, these
enforceable rights are not restricted to substantive
rights; rather, the Court has established a factored
test to determine the enforceability of rights under
§ 1983.176
The first factor addresses whether a law
contains a “federal right,” which, if found, creates a
rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable
under § 1983.177 The presumption is defeated only if
there is “textual indication” that Congress intended
to foreclose a remedy within the law that granted
the right.178 Jurisprudence has further provided
factors to aid courts in deciding the first inquiry.179
Courts first ask whether “Congress . . . intended
that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff .
. . . Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
right assertedly protected by the statute is not so
‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would
strain the judicial competence . . . . Third, the statute
must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
on the States . . . couched in mandatory rather than
precatory terms.”180
Thus, on the one hand, courts have held
that the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Medicaid
statute, and other federal laws grant rights enforceable
under § 1983.181 On the other hand, the Court has
held that the Supremacy Clause, the Natural Born
Citizen Clause, ERISA, and the Telecommunications
Act do not grant enforceable rights.182 Courts
denying the enforceability of rights generally cite the
comprehensive nature of the statutes that preclude
additional recovery under § 1983.183 Other concerns
are that laws do not convey a personal right or that
the rights are too amorphous to be enforceable.184
The Full Faith and Credit Clause passes this test.
The Clause grants a right—procedural or not—to an
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individual to have a sister-state recognize a judgment.
The right is not “vague or amorphous” because it is
clear in its intention to relieve litigants from having
to retry their case in every forum and to bind the
states in recognition of those judgments. Finally, the
Clause is phrased in mandatory terms—“Full Faith
and Credit shall be given . . . .”185
As applied to the circuit split, the plain
words and precedent indicate that the statute be
read as broadly as possible for enforcing rights of
the Constitution or federal laws.186 The Adar court
determined that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not create any substantive rights, merely procedural
rights.187 Although this may be a mischaracterization
of the couple’s claim,188 the language of § 1983 and
the case law explain that any right granted by the
Constitution or its statutes is enforceable under the
statute.189 The law does not distinguish, nor should
the court.190 The Clause grants adoptive parents the
right to have their adoption decrees recognized by
interstate courts—a right protected under the plain
language and case history of § 1983.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit was misguided
when it argued against a potential procedural
protection.191 As mentioned, the Supreme Court has
articulated very broad purposes for the statute.192
Therefore, for the Fifth Circuit to rationalize its
holding based on an argument that § 1983 is too
protective of plaintiff ’s rights clearly go against the
Court’s express articulation of the statute’s purpose.
This historical analysis and jurisprudence
examinations illustrate that the existing Adar/Finstuen
split should be resolved in favor of the Tenth Circuit’s
rationale. The Finstuen decision upholds the function
of Full Faith and Credit in a newer, more unified
nation. The Tenth Circuit also makes no exceptions
for a sister-state’s judgment and it correctly applies
Full Faith and Credit to all state actors. Finally, the
Tenth Circuit also keeps open the broad avenue of
federal courts for § 1983 litigants. Holdings contrary
to these rationales will result in substantial harm to
certain classes of people.
V. The Future: Some Parents Will Not Be
Parents
This section will address the legal and factual
errors of Adar. This section shows that, without
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proper resolution of the circuit split, these effects
will continue to hamper the parental rights and put
children at a severe disadvantage. Extrapolating Adar’s
holding highlights the decision’s detrimental effects
for homosexual couples and their legally adopted
children. It also shows that future courts ought not
perpetuate these detrimental effects by deciding cases
in line with the Tenth Circuit.
A. Legal Blunders of Adar
Besides the mistakes pointed out in the Adar
dissent and the issues regarding the circuit split, Adar
is flawed for several reasons.193 First, the Fifth Circuit
superficially assessed the couple’s claim by glossing
over the substantive rights and limiting its assessment
to the inter-state vehicle, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.194 Because of this insincere valuation, the court
dismissed the claim as procedural, not substantive.195
Furthermore, the court mistakenly claimed that the
decision would not frustrate any right conferred by
the New York adoption decree.196
1. Parenthood is More Than Procedure
The Fifth Circuit did away with the Adar
couple’s claim because § 1983 does not protect
procedural rights.197 However, the court failed to
fully appreciate the couple’s claim when it addressed
only the legal procedure for recognition of rights.
Beneath the veneer of Full Faith and Credit lay the
couple’s economic, legal, and social rights. Adoption
is
inherently
transformational—extinguishing
the rights and duties of the biological parents and
conferring them upon the adoptive parents.198
These rights constituted the couple’s claim—not a
procedural mechanism.
a. Economic Benefits
After the adoption is finalized, adoptive
parents are given a substantial amount of economic
benefits. There are some far-fetched examples of these
economic benefits, but many are practical for adoptive
parents.199 Common examples of the economic
benefit of parenthood are the tax consequence of
“writing off ” expenses or the individual right to child
support.200 Without a birth certificate listing one’s
self as a “parent,” an individual would have trouble
enforcing these rights. These typical economic rights
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of parenthood were the rights that the Adar couple
was seeking to enjoy with a re-issued birth certificate.
For a practical application of these rights,
imagine the consequences if, upon crossing the
Louisiana border, an unlisted parent decided to
ignore his obligation to contribute to the expenses of
rearing the child. The left-behind spouse would have
little to no recourse to recover financial aid from the
other person, despite the fact that a court determined
both parents were morally fit and declared them
both the legally adoptive parents of the child.201 The
Fifth Circuit cited this unstable relationship as the
reason for Louisiana’s prohibiting unmarried couples
from adopting—the “freely severable” nature of such
relationships might hurt the child and left-behind
spouse.202 However, if the court and state were serious
about protecting the family, the court and state would
want to insure that the left-behind spouse had some
redress against a delinquent “parent.” Without a birth
certificate evidencing that the irresponsible individual
is a legal parent of the child, the other spouse is unduly
burdened with the full costs of rearing the child. This
scenario results in a secondary denial—first, the state
denies a birth certificate request; second, the state
denies recourse to recover financial aid from the other
parent. This double denial will continue to affect
adoptive families if future courts adhere to the Adar
rationale rather than Finstuen.
b. Non-Economic Benefits
Without any hard data, one would not think
that tax benefits or inheritance rights would factor
into the decision to adopt. Rather, the legal and social
non-economic benefits that are enjoyed by parents
and perceived by others everyday are the commonsense perks of parenthood.
Legal benefits include everyday decisions
parents make for the child. Generally, any situation
wherein a parent represents a child as his agent is the
parent’s legal right. These situations include choosing
where to enroll the child in school and making
medical and emergency decisions for the child.203
Other aspects of parenthood involve access to the
child’s legal documents and the right to contact the
child’s biological parents after adoption.204 Finally,
the social benefits of parenthood may be the most
important for adoptive parents. Social benefits
include day-to-day rearing of the child, influencing
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the child’s development, and watching the child
grow. While a parent does not necessarily need a
birth certificate to be a positive influence on a child,
legal recognition becomes immensely important if
the couple splits up.205 Parents who completed the
adoption proceedings have evidenced a strong desire
to become a parent, and each parent is entitled to his or
her social parental rights. At the end of a relationship,
a parent without a birth certificate might lose the
right to custody and visitation.206 In this sense, a legal
document memorializing legal parenthood is crucial
for parents seeking their non-economic rights.
The situation of the Finstuen couple captures
these benefits well. Their child required swift medical
attention, an emergency ambulance ride, a potentially
life-saving decision, and a stay in an emergency
room.207 One parent was not able to ride in the
ambulance and had trouble getting into the hospital
room because she did not have a birth certificate.208
If the legally recognized parent was not there, the
un-listed person might have been unable to exercise
her decision-making authority, resulting in further
injury to the adopted child. The legal ability to make
these decisions is beneficial for the child’s health and
equally important as a parental right.
Thus, in Adar the parents sought the ability
to enjoy these substantive rights of parenthood—
economic, legal, and social. Full Faith and Credit
was merely the vehicle carrying these rights from
state to state. However, the Fifth Circuit’s assessment
superficially glanced at the couple’s complaint and
labeled the rights asserted as merely procedural
rather than substantive. This dismissal of the Adar
couple’s claims effectively denied them enjoyment
of their substantive parental rights.209 Future courts
deciding these issues would perpetuate this denial of
substantive rights if they adhere to Adar.
2. The Parents are Frustrated
The Adar court held that the couple’s
adoption was validly recognized and that the State
had not “frustrated” their rights.210 For the court to
maintain this holding, it must follow that the parents
do not need birth certificates to fully enjoy substantive
parental rights.211 This is not the case, however, and
future courts ought not to make the same mistake.
Louisiana’s statute regarding the evidentiary
value of birth certificates contradicts the court’s
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holding.212 The statute states that birth certificates
serve as “prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.”213 The content, or facts, of a birth certificate
are also statutorily determined, and they include
information about the child and parents—residences,
races, surnames, maiden names, etc. 214 These statutes,
read together, declare that birth certificates serve
as prima facie evidence of the parents’ identities.
Because certificates evidence who the parents are,
those parents need the legal document to prove their
parental status and enjoy their parental rights. The
Fifth Circuit claimed it had not “frustrated” the
couple’s rights, but Louisiana law clearly reveals that
birth certificates serve as legal evidence of determining
who the parents are.215 Without evidence, parents are
sure to face frustrations in enforcing their substantive
parental rights.
It may be that in some situations, an adoption
decree alone is not needed to enjoy the various
benefits of parenthood.216 However, the withholding
of a birth certificate surely serves as an unnecessary
obstacle for adoptive parents. These parents have
already filed numerous forms and affidavits and have
been judicially examined for moral fitness.217 Adding
another administrative hurdle to proving the validity
of an out-of-state adoption decree frustrates parental
rights, and the Adar court disregarded this burden for
adoptive parents when it held otherwise.218
Because judgments are greatly protected
and should not be undermined, this burden is also
likely unconstitutional.219 As the Tenth Circuit aptly
noted, the denial of the birth certificate is the denial
of the effective operation of the judgment.220 The
Fifth Circuit’s effective denial undermines the most
protected judgments and frustrates, if not denies,
parents’ substantive rights.221 This frustration will
continue under Adar’s precedent.
B. Extrapolating Adar
Besides the Fifth Circuit’s legal errors, the
court’s holding will have detrimental effects for several
classes of people: homosexual parents, adoptive
parents, and adopted children. Going forward, the
Adar decision will allow state officials to single out,
at their whim, individuals seeking the enforcement
of rights from out of state. The decision also places
homosexuals in a Catch-22 rendering them unable to
receive certain family rights whatsoever. Finally, this
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decision ultimately hurts not only the parents, but
the child as well.
1. Unbridled Discretion
Non-judicial state actors are currently free
to disregard Full Faith and Credit obligations under
Adar.222 This freedom alone would allow nonjudicial state actors wide latitude to undermine the
most protected class of documents and disregard
the determinations of a sister state. Moreover, under
Adar, liability-free actors can single out the effective
operations of sister-state judgments. Thus, state
actors have a dual-layered protection for violating
Full Faith and Credit. States can create self-governed
mechanisms to deny a judgment’s effective operation
and certain actors are not even obligated by Full Faith
and Credit.223
If the Adar court allowed this type of
denial for a judgment—an adoption decree—then
subsequent courts will certainly be able to deny
operation for lesser protected acts and records.
Drivers’ licenses provide an instructive example. Law
enforcement officers will not have to acknowledge an
out-of-state license because licenses are a state’s own
mechanism of enforcement. Thus, a driver would
have to seek each state’s mechanism where he wishes
to drive—that is, he would have to apply for a license
in each state’s DMV. This is assuming, of course, that
policemen even think about Full Faith and Credit
when they discretionarily deny recognition. After all,
the second layer of protection means that the Clause
does not apply to police officers.224
From a national point of view, this result is
the precisely the opposite of that compelled when one
considers the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. With each actor free from liability choosing
which judgments to give effect to, the nation becomes
a patchwork of recognition and enforcement. While
some states might be willing to issue new certificates
or recognize drivers’ licenses—thus giving operation
to the judgment or record—some states may not.
This end game smacks of a country of “Independent
Nations,”225 each free to ignore another’s judgment
vis-à-vis a denial of effective operation.226 This result
is inconsistent with the view of the Framers and the
Constitution itself.227
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2. Homosexuals: Never Spouses nor
Parents
With the newfound discretion and immunity
for certain state actors, one has to wonder what criteria
will influence that discretion. Of course, any decision
based on gender, race, or sex might subject the actor
to an Equal Protection claim.228 Homosexuals have
not yet been so statutorily protected.229 Although the
Louisiana adoption statute only prohibits unmarried
couples from adopting, one need not stretch the
imagination to see that non-judicial state officials will
discriminate against homosexuals with statutes, the
discretion, and the Full Faith and Credit immunity
granted by the Adar court.230
Non-judicial state officers’ discretion and
immunity can have an awful impact on homosexual
couples through the denial of the effective operation
of out-of-state judgments. Of course, homosexuals
will not be the only class discriminated against with
state actors’ newfound powers of discretion and
immunity. There will certainly be others. However,
unlike other discriminated classes, homosexuals will
be ensnared in a catch-22 when it comes to family
matters. That is to say, if an unmarried heterosexual
couple wishes to circumvent the Louisiana statute to
receive a Louisiana birth certificate, they need only
to marry each other.231 A gay couple cannot marry
in Louisiana (and many other states) to escape the
statute’s prohibition against unmarried couples
from adopting.232 Thus, homosexual couples can do
nothing to become either spouses or parents—stuck
in this family rights abyss.
3. Child as Ultimate Sufferer
The parents’ loss of substantive rights can be
considered from the adoptee’s point-of-view. If a state
actor chooses not to list either adoptive parent on a
birth certificate, the child will be stuck in a parentless limbo where the biological parents no longer have
any rights but the State is frustrating or denying the
adoptive parents’ substantive rights.
For example, the child ought to be able to
inherit from both adoptive parents and may need
a birth certificate to do so.233 This illustrates how
the denial of a birth certificate hampers the child’s
substantive rights. Another practical example would
be the issue of child support. As discussed, the nonlisted parent might be free to ignore his obligation
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to contribute finances for the child.234 Besides the
effect on the other parent, the child will likely suffer
the most harm from that scenario, as he is the one
with fewer resources. Furthermore, there are practical
considerations, which might impact the child’s
development; the most noticeable would be the issue
of custody and visitation.235 A child’s relationship
with his parents is a deeply psychological one.236
A parent faces an obstacle for custody or visitation
rights with the adoptee if he does not have a birth
certificate. From the child’s point-of-view, then, the
inability to see and visit a parent with whom he grew
up will detrimentally affect his personal development.
In a broader sense, a child’s loss of all these substantive
rights might render the child parent-less as soon as he
crosses a state-line.
Ultimately, the state is presumed to have
the best interest of the child in making decisions of
family law. Without birth certificates evidencing a
complete and “normal” family, the adopted children
might lose economic support of a former parent, lose
total contact with the parent, and even question the
legitimacy of their own family structure. All of these
effects carry long-term psychological damages.237
These detriments will continue if future courts do
not resolve the current circuit split in line with the
Tenth Circuit.
IV. Conclusion
In Article IV, the Constitution addresses
the internal workings of sister states in relation to
one another. Coming out of a fragmented system
of government, the Framers sought a more perfect
Union. One aspect of this new society would be the
level of respect each state owed to another, and over
the years, judicial decisions have been regarded as the
most protected class of sister-state documents. Because
adoption decrees are the judicial proclamation of
legal parenthood, transforming formerly childless
people into full-fledged parents, these decrees deserve
the same level of exacting faith and credit. Nothing
ought to undermine the decrees or their effects.
When a state refuses to grant birth certificates to
some adopting couples, the state is denying the
effective operation of those adoption decrees, which
is not only unconstitutional, but also detrimental to
couples and, more importantly, the children. The
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Fifth Circuit’s decision in Adar v. Smith created a
circuit-split on important issues of procedure and
Constitutional interpretation. The Fifth Circuit has
perpetuated an unconstitutional and discriminatory
practice of denying adopting parents the full benefits
of legal parenthood. Consequently, future courts
should resolve the existing circuit split in line with the
Tenth Circuit whose decision concerning out-of-state
adoption decrees conforms with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and causes less harm to several classes
of citizens: homosexual parents and adoptive families.
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